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Article 7

INFANT STOCKHOLDERS
The purpose of the present article is to set forth a few of
the general principles concerning the rights and liabilities of
infant stockholders in corporations organized for profit, with
particular attention to the Indiana cases upon the subject.
Where the'contract of a minor is involved, the questions
which immediately present themselves are whether or not
such contract is binding upon the infant, under what conditions may the minor disaffirm the same, and what will be
the result of such disaffirmance. What is to follow in the
succeeding pages will deal chiefly with these three questions.
An infant may subscribe for stock in a corporation, unless
the charter of the icorporation or a statute of the state provides otherwise.' We have no statute in Indiana preventing
an infant from becoming-a stockholder. But an infant cannot be an incorporator in this state, because our state statute
requires at least three incorporators, all of whom must be of
lawful age." Prior to the enactment of this section, however,
there was nothing in the laws of Indiana to prevent a minor
from being one o-f the incorporators of a new corporation.
A subscription for corporate stock by an infant may, at
his option, be disaffirmed and repudiated when the infant
attains his majority and, upon such disaffirmance, he cannot
be held liable either to the corporation or to its creditors
or to an innocent purchaser of a note given by him for such
subscription.' All jurisdictions agree that a stock subscription contract made by a minor, is voidable and not void.
Consequently, it may become binding by ratification after
the minor has reached his majority. Such ratification is valid
even though, at the time of ratification, the infant was ignorant of his right to disaffirm.4
1

2 FLETCHER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS,

§ 546.

2 BuR~s' ANN. IND. STAT. (SuPP. 1929) § 4835.
3 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 1; 31 C. J. 1098.

4 Clark v. Van Court, 100 Ind. 113 (1884).
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The minor may avoid his stock subscription contract by
disaffirmance upon reaching full age. The authorities are in
harmony upon this point.' But such disaffirmance must be
made by the minor or by his legal representative. The plea
of infancy is a personal privilege and is not available to
others in privity of estate.' This privilege remains purely
personal during the lifetime of the minor, though the exercise of such privilege by the minor himself may inure to his
privies in estate.7
We find, however, a lack of harmony in the decisions upon
the question of what conditions are necessary to entitle the
infant to disaffirm his contract. Here again all agree that
he is entitled to the return of the purchase price upon a
return of, or an. offer to return, the- stock which he has
bought.' Upon this point the Supreme Court of Indiana, in
Carpenterv. Carpenter,9 said:
" 'If the minor, when avoiding his contract, have in his hands any of
its fruits specifically, the act of avoiding the contract by which he
acquired such property will divest him of all right to retain the same;
and the other party may reclaini it. He cannot avoid in part only, but
must make the contract wholly void if at all; so that it will no longer
protect him in the retention of the consideration. Badger v. Phinney,
15 Mass. 359; Bigelow v. Kinney, 3 Verm. 353. Or, if he retain and
use or dispose of such property after becoming of age, it may be held
as an affirmance of the contract by which he acquired it, and thus
deprive him of the right to avoid. Boyden v. Boyden, 9 Met. 519;
Robbins v. Eaton, 10 N. H. 561. But if the consideration has. passed
from his hands, either wasted or expended during his minority, he is
5 Wuller v. Chuse Groc. Co., 241 Iii. 398, 89 N. E. 796, 132 A.

S.R.

216,, 28

L. R! A. (N. S.) 128, 16 Ann. Cas. 522 (1909); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 45 Ind.

142 (1873); White v. Branch, 51 Ind. 210 (1875); Indianapolis Chair Mfg. Co. v.
Wilcox, 59 Ind. 429 (1877); Shirk v. Shultz, 113 Ind. 571 (1887); Seeley v.
Seeley-Howe-LeVan Co., 128 Iowa 294, 103 N. W. 961 (1905); Robinson v.
Weeks, 56 Me. 102 (1868); White v. New Bedford Cotton Waste Corporation, 178
Mass. 20, 59 N. E. 642 (1901); Godfrey v. :Mutual Finance Corporation, 242 Mass.
197, 136 N. E. 178 (1922); Danziger v. Iron Clad Realty & Trading Co., 141 N.
Y. S. 593 (1913); Gage v. Menczer, 144 S. W. 717 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
1
6 Harris v. Ross, Treas., 112 Ind. 314, 13 N. E. 873 (1887).
7 Shrock v. Crowl, 83 Ind. 243 (1882), citing Pitcher v. Laycock, 7 Ind. 398
(1856), and Price v. Jennings, 62 Ind. 111 (1878).
8 Wuller v. Chuse Groc. Co., op.-cit. supra note 5; Seeley v. Seeley-HoweLeVan Co., op. cit. supra note 5; Crowley v. Mutual Finance Corporation, 242
Mass. 259, 136 N. E. 179 (1922); Gage v. Menczer, op. cit. supra note S.
9 OP. cit su ra note 5, at 146.
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-not thereby to be deprived of his right or capacity to avoid his deed,
any more than he is to avoid his executory contracts. And the adult
who deals with him must seek the return of the consideration paid or
delivered.to the minoi in the same modes and with the same chances
of loss in the one case as in the other. Dana v. Stearns, 3 Cush. 372.
It is not necessary, in order to give effect to the disaffirmance'of the
deed or contract of a minor, that the other party should be placed in
statu quo. Tucker v.Moreland, 10 Pet. 65-74; Shaw v. Boyd, 5 S.
& R. 309.'"

In 'establishing his right to a cancellation of the contract,
the infant, of course, must show that his contract was with
the defendant.' °
The avoidance of such contract by the infant may be
made either before or after the infant reaches his majority. 1
The fact of infancy at the time of the making of the contract is never presumed. Rather, the presumption is that
the parties thereto were all of full age. The infant, there12
fore, must plead and prove such fact when askifig for relief.'
As previously stated, the authorities disagree as to the
conditions upon which the minor is entitled to a return of the
consideration paid by him. Perhaps the greatpr weight of
authority is that the minor, as a condition precedent to a recovery of the consideration paid by him) must return or
tender a return of the property received under the contract,
if it still remains in his hands. 3 In Indiana, however, no
such condition precedent is required. The infant may dis-.
affirm his subscription contract without returning or tendering the return of the stock which he has purchased, even
though he still has the same in his possession.' 4 Upon such
10 White v. New Bedford Cotton Waste Corporation, 52 N. E. 632 (Mass.
1899.)
11 Rice v. Boyer, 108 Ind. 472, 9 N. E. 420, 58 Am. Rep. 53 (1886); Shipley
v. Smith, 162 Ind. 526, 70 N. E. 803 (1904); Childs v. Dobins, 55 Iowa 205,
7 N. W. 498 (1880); Robinson v. Weeks, op. cit. su'pra note 5; Chapin v. Shafer,
49 N. Y. 407 (1872).
12 Pitcher v. Laycock, op. cit. supra note 7.
13 See Note to Wuller v. Chuse Groc. Co., in 16 Ann. Cas. 522.
14 Pitcher v. Laycock, op. cit. supra note 7; Miles v. Lingerman, 24 Ind. 385
(1865); Briggs v. McCabe, 27 Ind. 327 (1866); Carpenter v. Carpenter, op. cit.
supra note 5; State ex rel. Hutson v. Joest, 46 Ind. 235 (1874); Towell v.
Pence, 47 Ind. 304 (1874); Dill v. Bowen, 54 Ind. 204 (1876); Clark v. Van
Court, op. cit. supra note 4; Shirk v. Shultz, op. cit. supra note 5; Shipley v.
Smith, op. cit. supra note 11; Story & Clark Piano Co. v. Davy, 68 Ind. App.
150, 160 (1918).
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disaffirmance, however, the title to such stock, if the same
has not been alienated by the infant, reverts to the vendor
and the vendor may thereupon bring an action for the cancellation of the stock or an action in replevin for its return."'
Whether or not the return of the stock or a tender thereof,
when the same remains in the possession and ownership of
the infant, should be a condition precedent to a recovery of
the consideration paid by the infant might well be a matter
for discussion. In one sense the result is the same, that is,
the infant must eventually return any stock still remaining
in his hands. The requirement of such a condition precedent,
however, prevents a multiplicity of suits. All the rights of
the parties are then determined in one action, because the
infant must show, before he is entitled to a recovery, that
he has returned or offered to return all of the stock remaining under his control. Where no such condition precedent is
required, the vendor must commence a separate action
against the infant to recover the stock which he still retains,
the title to which has become revested in the vendor by the
minor's act of disaffirmance. But even in Indiana, the minor
must tender a return of the stock, if he seeks the aid of a
court .of equity to obtain the cancellation of his contract.
Equity will not permit him to retain the benefits thereof and
at the same time relieve him of all liability thereon16 Here
a distinction is made between the case where the minor invokes the equitable powers of the court to cancel his stock
subscription contract and the case where the minor comes
into court to seek the return of the consideration paid by
him upon a stock subscription contract, which he hag already avoided by a previous act of disaffirmance. In the
latter case the contract is already rendered void and the
minor merely seeks the return of the property to which he
is given a legal right by his previous disaffirmance.
The right of an infafit to avoid a contract for the purchase of corporate stock is an absolute and paramount right,
15 Carpenter v. Carpenter, op. cit. supra note 5; White v. Branch, op. cit.
supra note 5; Shirk v. Shultz, op. cit. supra note 5.
16 Pitcher v. Laycock, op. cit. supra note 7; Miles v. Lingerman, op. cit.
supra note 14.
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superior to all equities of other persons. 7 Neither will conditions arising after the purchase of the stock by the infant
affect his right to disaffirm the contract upon reaching his
majority. He may recover the price paid for the stock without any allowance for depreciation in the capital of the corporation."5
The disaffirmance of the contiact by the infant renders
it void from the beginning, and the parties thereto are thereby returned to the same relative positions which they occupied before the contract was made."' As shown in the above
quotation from Carpenter v. Carpenter, after disaffirmance,
the parties are left to seek relief in the same modes and with
the same changes of loss as in any other case where an
owner seeks the return of property held by another. If the
minor has sold or squandered the property which he received,
no recovery can be had by the other party, and, if the corporation or vendor in the meantime has become bankrupt or
insolvent, the infant has only a general claim against the
bankrupt or insolvent estate for the return of the consideration paid by him, unless preference to such claim can be
given without prejudice to 'the rights of creditors. In the
words of the Supreme Court of Iowa:
"Whether a ,trust existed in favor of either of these parties as
against the corporation is not decisive of the right to a preference in
the distribution of the funds. There must be some showing that the
estate has been augmented by the trust fund, or, at least, that the
estate has been so benefited by the misappropriation of the trust fund
that the removal of its equivalent from the estate will be without prejudice to creditors." 20

'Ordinarily the infant cannot follow money, which he has
paid for the purchase of stock, into the hands of a third person. In such case he has only a claim against a corporation
or the vendor of the stock. Even the recovery of money was
allowed in one case from a third person, a bank to which the
17 Gage v. Menczer, op. cit. supra note 5.

18 Godfrey v. Mutual Finance Corporation, op. cit. supra note 5.

19 Shrock v. Crowl, op. cit. supra note 7; Rice v. Boyer, op. cit. supra
note 11.
20 Seeley v. Seeley-Howe-LeVan Co., op. cit. supra note 5.
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vendor had paid the money in satisfaction of his own debt
to the bank, where it was shown that the bank had notice
that the money was received from the saleof such stock to
the minor. 21 Where the infant transfers other personal property in consideration for the stock purchased, upon disaffirmance of his contract, he will be permitted to follow such
property and recover the same from a third person to whom
it has been transferred, even though such third person be
an innocent purchaser for value. 2 The act of disaffirmahce
makes void the title of the other contracting party to such
property and the title of the third person is thereby also
rendered void. The third person can receive no better title
than was in his vendor.
Where corporate stock has been transferred to a minor,
a question frequently arises as to whether or not the liabilities of a stockholder are thereby removed from the transferor
and imposed upon the infant. Here we find the general
rule to be that the transferor is not relieved from liability to
creditors, even though the corporation was solvent when the
transfer was made, unless, in the meantime, the infant has
attained his majority and ratified the transfer. This rule
is placed upon the ground that, the transferor cannot relieve
himself from liability unless the transfer is made to one capable of assuming the liabilities of a stockholder and to one
who cannot subsequently repudiate such liabilities. 2 3 In the
case of Foster v. Lincoln et al.,24 the court held that a voluntary transfer of national bank stock to minors did not relieve
the transferor of his statutory liability as a stockholder,
since he knew at the time of the transfer that the bank was
in a precarious condition. Tl~e acquiescence of the national
bank in such a transfer is of no avail to the transferor, since
the officers of the bank have no power or authority to waive
the statutory liability placed upon stockholders of national
banks.2 5
21
22
23
24
25

Gage v. Menczer, op. cit. supra note 5.
Craig v. Van Bebber, 100 Mo. 584, 18 A. S. R. 569, note 661 (1890),
6 FLETCHER, ENCYCLOPEDIA CP CORPORATIONS, § 4203, and cases cited.
74 Fed. 382 (1896).
Aldrich v. Bingham, 131 Fed. 363 (1904).
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Another situation which frequently arises is the case where
an adult purchases stock in the name of an infant. In such
case the contract is really between the adult and the corporation.
It is simply the case of a contract between two
parties, capable of contracting, made for the benefit of a
third person, who is an infant. In such case the infant has
no right to avoid the contract.2 ' A father buying stock in a
national bank assumes the statutory liability as a shareholder, even though the stock is purchased in the names of
his minor children, because the consent of such minors does
not render them absolutely liable as stockholders. They may
at any time, before or after reaching majority, repudiate
such liability. '- The liability of the, father in such case will
not be affected, even though, after the assessment is made,
but before suit is brought thereon, the minor becomes of age
and ratifies. the purchase of the stock in his name.28
A trustee, however, may hold stock in a national bank for
the benefit of minors and, in such case, the trustee' is not
personally liable for the statutory assessment against stockholders."0 This decision is based upon the express provisions
of our Federal Act," ° which expressly provides that in such
case the trustee shall not be personally liable, but the liability shall attach to the trust fund or estate in his .hands as
such trustee. In such case, of course, there is no personal
liability upon the minor.
There still remains the question of dividends upon stock
held by minors. Where the corporation or the vendor has
dealt with an adult, presuming to act in the name of a minor,
there can be no question in this regard. The corporation
must pay the dividends to whomsoever the adult designates,
since there is no possibility of a subsequent disaffirmance by
26 Winkler v. Los Angeles Investment Co., 43 Cal. App. 408, 185 Pac. 312
(1919); Stumpf v. Halstead Land, etc., Co., 59 Misc. 529, 110 N. Y. S. 838
(1908); Stettheimer v. Wood Harmon Richmond RealtyCo., 167 N. Y. S. 1059
(1918).
27 Foster v. Cbiase, 75 Fed. 797 (1896).
"
28 Foster v. Wilson, 75 Fed. 797 (1896).
20 McNair v. Darragh, 31 Fed. (2d.) 906 (1929)
(Certiori denied, Gamble
v. Darragh, 50 S. Ct. 19).
30 12 U. S. C. A. § 66.
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the minor for whose benefit the contract was made. Neither
can the corporation refuse to pay dividends upon stock purchased by the minor in his own name. The infant may bring
suit upon a contract entered into with him personally to enforce liability assumed therein by the party with whom the
contract was made. 3 '
"Whenever a party enters into a contract with a minor personally,
or purchases property of him, or deals with him or on his account.
such party must respond to him in an action the same as though he
was an adult. So in all cases when an infant has the possession and
control ot his property 'he may bring his action for its conversion for
any damage or injury to it the same as though he was of full age." 32

The disaffirmance of the contract for the purchase of
stock, as stated above, relates back to the time of the purchase and renders the contract void from its inception.
Theoretically, therefore, the corporation, which has sold
stock direct to a minor, is revested with title to the dividends
paid during the period between the time of purchase and
the time of disaffirmance. Practically, however, this revesting of title is of little consequence, since dividends are nearly
always paid in cash, which cannot be recovered. The decided
cases aff6rd little help in a discussion of this question. In
fact, only a very few of the decisions refer to dividends at
all. This is perhaps largely due to the fact that, in most
instances, the minor repudiates his contract for the reason
that no dividends have been received upon the stock. No
one objects to assuming the responsibility of a stockholder
so long as he receives dividends on the stock, which makes
the ownership thereof profitable. It is only when the dividends cease and the liabilities become actual that an attempt
is made to avoid the. contract of purchase. In the case of
Indianapolis Chair Manufacturing Co. v. Wilcox, "3 a dividend was declared while the stock was held by the infant,
31 TYLER, INFANCY AND COVERTURE (2nd. ed.), 200.
32 TYLER, op. cit. supra note 31, at 193.

33 Op. cit. supra note 5.
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but the right to retain such dividend was not considered. A
dividend had also been paid to the minor on the stock involved in the case of Godfrey v. Mutual Finance Corporation,34 but the plaintiff in that case offered to return the
dividend received, so no issue on that score was raised or
decided. The corporation, however, has a right to demand
the return of a stock dividend which has been issued to the
minor, if the stock received as such dividend has not been
transferred by him. This is in accordance ,with the general
rules regarding the rights of the parties upon disaffirmance.,
-Henry Hasley.
FORT WAYNE, INDIANA.

34 Op. cit. supra note S.
P

